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Abstract
Since 2017, China has adopted the "tolerant and prudent" policy in regulating emerging digital platform
industries. The impacts of this policy on labour precarity have been rarely studied. Drawing on an original
survey of over 600 ride-hailing drivers in two Chinese cities, Nanjing and Beijing, we conduct a political
economy analysis for a three-party framework involving the municipal government, capital, and labour.
We find that, in accordance with the "tolerant and prudent" principle, municipal governments stipulated
regulations regarding the qualifications of ride-hailing vehicles and drivers. These regulations, although
they can help reduce labour precarity in the marketplace for licensed drivers, have exacerbated precarity in
the workplace. Specifically, in response to the regulations, the ride-hailing platforms aligned with thirdparty rental companies that provided licensed vehicles. This arrangement has effectively trapped many ridehailing drivers in the industry: our quantitative analysis shows that drivers bounded by a rental or rent-toown agreement worked significantly longer hours than counterparts who steered their own vehicles.
Keywords: tolerant and prudent; online ride-hailing industry; digital platforms; labour precarity; China
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To drive for the platforms, car renting and rent-to-own are both deep traps.
—— A Didi Express driver
On July 28, 2016, the State Council of China approved and released “the world’s first nationwide online
ride-hailing regulations,” lifting the online ride-hailing industry out of the grey area.1 To be granted legal
status in the market, both ride-hailing drivers and vehicles should obtain special ride-hailing licenses.
Municipal governments across the country have since stipulated nuanced regulations for what qualifications
or standards these licenses entail. 2 These regulations have had far-reaching impacts on not only the
development of the ride-hailing industry but also the welfare of ride-hailing drivers.
The regulations stipulated by the municipal governments reflect the state’s "tolerant and prudent" (barong
Shenzhen !"#$)" principle towards the platform industry, which was formally articulated in the 2017
annual government work report.3 According to Premier Li Keqiang, "tolerant and prudent" means that the
government shall allow and encourage the development of the emerging industry as long as it obeys extant
laws.4 As he explained, 'prudent' has double meanings: "first, when these new forms of business are at their
early stage, we should not impose extremely stringent regulations but should observe for a certain period
until we fully understand them; second, we should stick to the bottom line of safety... and, in accordance
with laws, we should firmly crack down on illegal behaviours… ."5 As such, this principle has not only
granted a loose regulatory environment for the emerging platform sector, it has left the relations between
platforms and labour in ambiguity.6
Based on an original survey of over 600 ride-hailing drivers conducted in two Chinese cities, Nanjing and
Beijing, this study investigates both qualitatively and quantitatively how the "tolerant and prudent" policy
has shaped labour precarity that ride-hailing drivers face.7 Our analysis indicates that, in translating the
spirit of "tolerant and prudent", municipal governments tend to carry out marketplace regulations by setting
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market entry qualifications. These qualifications, to a large extent, mimic the existing regulatory framework
that governs the traditional taxi industry. The workplace relations between the platforms and drivers,
however, are unattended. Such selectivity has produced mixed effects on labour precarity:
On the one hand, the regulations grant qualified drivers legal status and limit excessive competition by
setting entry barriers, which can help reduce licensed drivers’ precarity in the marketplace.8 On the other
hand, the regulations have intensified precarity in the workplace. We find that to retain an adequate supply
of drivers, the platforms aligned with third-party car rental companies to provide qualified vehicles to
drivers who are otherwise constrained from working with an eligible car. Yet, as reflected in the opening
quote from a ride-hailing driver we interviewed, many drivers feel trapped in the industry by the platformrental company alliance. To pay off car loans or rents, drivers bound by rental or rent-to-own agreements
have ended up working extra-long hours and bearing excessive income uncertainties. Specifically, our
quantitative analysis shows that these drivers worked significantly longer hours (20-50 per cent more) than
drivers who worked with their own vehicles.
This research makes two contributions. First, it develops a political-economic analysis for comprehending
how the "tolerant and prudent" policy accommodates the advent of new economic forms and its impacts on
labour welfare. Through a tripartite framework involving municipal governments, capital (platforms and
third-party car rental companies), and labour, we explore how regulations are crafted, how capital reacts,
and how labour precarity is eventually shaped. Second, our analysis is based on an original survey
conducted in the summers of 2018 (in Nanjing) and 2019 (in both Nanjing and Beijing). We chose these
two cities because Nanjing is representative of China's big cities in terms of ride-hailing regulations,
whereas Beijing is unique for its extremely stringent regulations. Their comparison uncovers some
interesting findings. In the survey, we interviewed more than 600 ride-hailing drivers of Didi Express (Didi
Kuaiche %%&')—the standard, and core, service of Didi Chuxing.9 Unlike online surveys distributed
through the web or the platform app, face-to-face surveys increase response rates and allow the interviewers
to probe for more detailed, and more accurate, information from the interviewees.10 Also, the relatively
large sample size allows us to quantitatively gauge the effect of the platform-car rental company alliance
on drivers’ precarity.
The remainder of this article consists of the following sections. We begin with an analysis of the "tolerant
8
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and prudent" policy towards the advent of the platform economy. We then propose a tripartite framework
to demonstrate how municipal governments craft regulatory policies to accommodate the "tolerant and
prudent" principle, how capital reacts to those policies, and how drivers’ precarity is shaped. A quantitative
analysis follows that estimates the magnitude of labour precarity measured by work hours. In the last section,
we discuss the implications and conclude our work.

Contextualizing the "Tolerant and Prudent" Policy
The "tolerant and prudent" policy was formulated during a time when the government’s supply-side
structural reform since late-2015 worsened employment. It was also a time when China's private sector
investment was struggling with stagnant growth, putting further pressure on employment. Under these
circumstances, the ride-hailing sector was finally given a green light and promoted in the national
development agenda as a champion of job creation.11
Indeed, the ride-hailing sector has a number of advantages in the area of job generation. First, platform jobs
present a combination of flexibility and low-barrier to entry. Second, private car ownership in China has
increased rapidly in recent years,12 making the online ride-hailing industry a convenient solution for many
of the unemployed and underemployed. Third, the ride-hailing industry has the potential to further create
jobs by continuously improving dispatching algorithms and architecting big data infrastructure in the cloud.
Finally, as a nascent industry, the ride-hailing sector in China has attracted intense investment worldwide,13
which predicts growing job opportunities.
The “tolerant and prudent” regulatory approach signals that the state, in the midst of economic downturns,
embraces the platform economy and the creation of a loose regulatory environment. "Prudent" does not
mean that the government holds a cautious or skeptical attitude towards the development of new industries;
rather, it reflects the state’s determination to restrict itself from intervening and leave the rest to the market.
Consistent with this spirit (while taking into account local circumstances), China's municipal governments
have demanded only that emerging industries obey existing laws and regulations that are intended to
regulate market order and avoid excessive competition. In the ride-hailing industry, the online platforms
are required to follow existing regulations that govern the traditional taxi industry in the marketplace. As
noted in the next section, these regulations focus mainly on setting market entry qualifications for drivers
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and vehicles.
There is, however, one major problem with this arrangement: the employment relationship in the new
industry is not subject to the existing regulatory framework. Particularly in scholarship about labour law,
there has been an explosion of discussion during the last several years about whether platform workers
deserve the same legal protection as standard employees.14 Also growing is literature that explores how the
rise of the platform economy has aggravated labour precarity in China.15 Several conclusions have been
posited. Platforms act as intermediaries that connect service/product providers and customers, furnishing
them with an easy escape from employers’ obligations (minimum wage, social insurance, paid sick leave,
etc.) and allowing them to outsource and pursue lean production “in heightened form”.16 Because platforms
profit from charging commission fees for each service, they have incentives to maximize the number of
service suppliers, which often leads to excessive competition and uncertainties in employment for suppliers.
Platform workers may have the freedom to decide when to work and for how long, but they cannot decide
how their work should be done once they log in. Their activities are closely monitored by the platform’s
algorithmic management.17 Under the "tolerant and prudent" principle, the state in effect has allowed the
welfare of platform labour to be determined by market forces.

Market-focused Regulations, the Platform-Car Rental Company Nexus, and Labour
Precarity
We propose a political-economy framework to examine the impacts of the “tolerant and prudent” principle
on labour precarity in China’s ride-hailing sector. As Figure 1 briefly summarizes, this framework consists
of three stakeholders—the municipal government, capital (including both the platforms and third-party
rental companies), and labour (ride-hailing drivers)—that act in sequence. First, to accommodate the state’s
"tolerant and prudent" principle while addressing and balancing its own objectives/interests, the municipal
government applies local market entry regulations to the online ride-hailing industry, mimicking the ones
that govern the traditional taxi industry in the marketplace. Otherwise, the workplace of the newly emerging
industry is left unattended. Second, to meet the regulations stipulated by the municipal government while
ensuring smooth operations, the platform chooses to align with third-party car rental companies that provide
eligible vehicles. Third, drivers decide their work mode and work time in response to their financial
circumstances. This whole process has shaped the precarity of different driver groups in different aspects.
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In the rest of this section, we elaborate in detail the strategies and logic of action of each stakeholder.
(Figure 1 is about here.)

The municipal government: the logic of market-focused regulations
We begin with the municipal government. At the municipal level, the state's "tolerant and prudent" policy
is translated into market-focused regulations that align with the municipal government’s multiple objectives.
The ride-hailing economy requires two dimensions of space to grow.
First, the development of the platform economy needs infrastructure space. Because the provisioning of
ride-hailing services uses physical resources, such as roads and parking facilities, over-expansion of the
industry can increase traffic congestion and air pollution in metropolitan areas.18 Moreover, the onlinehailed ride services can divert passengers from public transportation to private vehicles; thus, the efficiency
of public transport as a common pool resource can be undermined and the “tragedy of the commons” can
occur.
Second, the development of a platform economy needs market space. The services provided by ride-hailing
drivers and traditional taxi drivers are highly homogeneous, but the former is often less costly to passengers
for a variety of reasons. For instance, the ride-hailing platforms usually provide heavy subsidies at the early
stages of development to entice passengers (and also drivers); part-time drivers are likely to accept lower
price rates; and, more importantly, the platforms provide no employment-related benefits to drivers and,
therefore, enjoy a labour cost advantage over traditional taxi companies. As a result, the development of
the ride-hailing platforms poses a serious threat to the traditional taxi industry.
The allocation of spaces depends upon how municipal governments prioritize competing objectives. In the
Chinese context, two main problems emerged in the early stage when the market was not regulated:
exacerbated traffic congestion; and ramping discontent among traditional taxi companies and drivers. For
example, evidence shows that new vehicle ownership in China suddenly increased after Uber entered the
Chinese market.19 Government officials from the Beijing Municipal Commission of Transportation linked
the sudden deterioration of Beijing’s traffic conditions in 2015 to the rapid expansion of ride-hailing
industry (exacerbated also by plunging oil prices).20 The fast-growing industry also has provoked taxi
driver strikes and protests across China. 21 As a result, on December 21, 2016, Beijing’s municipal
18
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government issued ride-hailing service regulations, Detailed Regulations for Implementing the Beijing
Online Ride-hailing Service Management Measures (beijingshi wangluo yuyue chuzu qiche jingying fuwu
guanli shishi xize《北京市网络预约出租汽车经营服务管理实施细则》), that stipulate that the
development of ride-hailing services should be tailored to address concerns specific to Beijing, China’s
capital city, including traffic congestion and high rates of taxi usage. 22 A parallel document issued in
Nanjing on January 19, 2017, Nanjing Municipality’s Temporary Measures on the Management of Online
Ride-hailing Services (nanjingshi wangluo yuyue chuzu qiche guanli zanxing banfa《南京市网络预约出
租汽车管理暂行办法》), states more specifically that public security organs should assist relevant
supervisory departments to “actively prevent and appropriately manage mass incidents in the taxi industry
and maintain social stability”.23
With these concerns in mind, the municipal governments of Nanjing and Beijing set concrete qualification
requirements for both drivers and vehicles. The regulations stipulated by the two cities share a common and
essential element: a requirement for “double-licenses” (shuang zheng 双证). That is, in addition to holding
an ordinary driver’s license, each prospective ride-hailing driver must apply for and receive from the
municipal Department of Transportation a special “online ride-hailing driver’s license” (wangluo yuyue
chuzu qiche jiashiyuanzheng 网络预约出租汽车驾驶员证). Also, vehicles used for ride-hailing operation
require a special “online ride-hailing vehicle license” (wangluo yuyue chuzeche yunshuzheng 网络预约出
租车运输证) that indicates the vehicle’s commercial status. To fulfil this requirement, a local license plate
is required, as is a more expensive insurance for commercial vehicles, and the vehicle used must comply
with specified hardware thresholds, such as wheelbase width and swept volume.
Despite similarities, marked differences distinguish the stringency of the two cities’ regulation measures.
These distinctions are primarily determined by differences in the policy objectives of the two municipal
governments. Compared to Nanjing, Beijing imposes more stringent regulations on driver and vehicle
qualifications. For example, in Nanjing, the prerequisite for applying for a ride-hailing driver’s license is a
local residence permit (juzhuzheng 居住证); in contrast, the Beijing municipality requires a local hukou
(permanent residency status), which is far more difficult to obtain.24 Although in both cities a local license
plate is the main prerequisite for applying for a ride-hailing vehicle’s license, in practice, the requirement
is far more difficult to achieve in Beijing: to combat traffic congestion and air pollution, the Beijing
municipal government since 2011 has employed a lottery system that limits the number of local license
22
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plates issued annually.25 No such restriction is imposed in Nanjing. Clearly, the more stringent ride-hailing
regulation unveiled in Beijing is intended to limit the entry of vehicles and drivers (and especially migrant
workers) into the market. This difference reflects Beijing’s pressing goal of limiting population, minimizing
congesting, and harnessing pollution. The requirements in Beijing have de facto eliminated the possibility
that migrant workers could work legally in the ride-hailing sector.
To a great extent the market-focused regulations replicate the policy framework used for supervising the
traditional taxi sector. For example, like ride-hailing drivers, traditional taxi drivers in both Nanjing and
Beijing must hold a specific taxicab license as well as an ordinary driver’s license. In Beijing, both
traditional taxi drivers and ride-hailing drivers are required to have a local hukou, while drivers in Nanjing
only need to have local residency. Embedding a new form of economy into the existing institutional
framework is consistent with the state’s "tolerant and prudent" principle. The main logic behind the marketfocused regulations is that, by applying uniform thresholds for market entry, municipal governments can
balance the interests of the traditional and newly emerging sectors.
The regulations can restrain excessive competition by setting entry barriers; thus they can reduce
marketplace precarity for licensed drivers. However, it should be noted that illegal drivers still widely exist
in both cities, who benefit from less competition but face increased marketplace precarity due to the risk of
being penalized. Once being caught by regulators, these drivers have to either pay the penalty
(approximately 10,000-30,000 yuan) or quit the market. Thus, the regulations have mixed effects on the
marketplace precarity for unlicensed drivers. Our survey shows, in 2019, 72 per cent of the drivers in
Nanjing fulfilled the requirement, while the vast majority of drivers in Beijing did not. The contrast
illustrates how the municipal governments navigate both the state’s “tolerant and prudent” principle and
complex local priorities and objectives.26 Nevertheless, in both Beijing and Nanjing, regulators have shown
no interest in intervening in the relationship between the platforms and drivers, thus leaving the distribution
of gains between capital and labour to be determined by market power. Apparently, job creation ranks
higher in the government agenda than conflicts in capital-labour relations.

The platform: forging alliance with third-party car rental companies
Our analysis of the platform is based on Didi Chuxing, which has captured 80 per cent of the market share
in the Mainland since the acquisition in 2016 of Uber’s China operations. Despite dominant market share,
competition in the country’s ride-hailing industry remains intense as new rivals (including but not limited
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to Meituan, Shouqi, and Caocao) are quickly springing up. 27 Retaining drivers has increasingly been
critical for Didi. The number of service providers and passengers are mutually dependent.28 When drivers
are in short supply, a vicious cycle of losing passengers by losing drivers can occur. The regulatory hurdles
laid out by the municipal governments of both Nanjing and Beijing are obviously a tough call for Didi
because they have great potential, albeit in different degrees, to reduce the number of drivers in the market.
The platform has to achieve a balance between complying with regulations and retaining as many drivers
as possible: if the platform strictly follows government rules, the number of drivers will be substantially
reduced because many drivers have no qualified identification or vehicles; however, if the platform
continues recruiting disqualified drivers, then both the platform and drivers violate government regulations
and risk being penalized. Under such circumstances, Didi has adopted different strategies in Nanjing and
Beijing to accommodate different regulatory environments.
As noted above, the regulations stipulated by the Nanjing municipal government regarding drivers’
qualifications are relatively loose. The main obstacle to entering the market lies in the regulation of vehicles.
Pressured by mounting discontent in the deeply-affected traditional taxi industry, Nanjing since April 2018
has suspended the issuance of commercial-use vehicle licenses to individuals. The stated aim was to “purify
the environment of the taxi industry” and alleviate the “pressure on urban transportation management
caused by rapid growth of the ride-hailing sector”.29 This suspension has effectively increased the difficulty
of fulfilling the “double-licenses” requirement.
To retain drivers on the platform, Didi in Nanjing has closely cooperated with third-party car rental
companies that can provide vehicles with the required licenses. The rental companies invest in qualified
vehicles and obtain licenses from the government. Didi promises to prioritize the drivers enrolled by rental
companies in dispatching orders; in some cases, Didi holds shares of the rental company. The rental
companies maintain no employment relations with rentee-drivers; rather, they are bound together by a
leasing or debt contract. In essence, these rental companies are the third party of the third party; that is, they
are an intermediary layer that sits atop the ride-hailing platform, which is itself the intermediary between
drivers and passengers. In this arrangement, the strategic alliance of the platform and car rental companies
has to a great extent replicated the operation of the traditional taxi industry: the platform-rental company
nexus provides licensed taxi vehicles, while individual rentee-drivers provide taxi services and share a
significant percentage of the gross fares with platforms and rental companies. The principal difference is
that the traditional mode usually involves standard employment relations, while the new one does not. The
27
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platform, in other words, has circumvented the statutory obligations of employers, which challenges labour
welfare.
The participation of third-party car rental companies in the Chinese ride-hailing industry is unique.
According to our survey, in 2019, up to about 40 per cent of ride-hailing drivers in Nanjing acquired
vehicles from rental companies. Nanjing’s rental companies offer two options to drivers: renting or rent-toown. The latter is equivalent to a mortgage loan: once a down payment is made, the driver becomes entitled
to immediate possession of a vehicle that has a ride-hailing license. On the one hand, the involvement of
rental companies enables unqualified drivers (those lacking a ride-hailing car license) in Nanjing to obtain
legal status in the market. These drivers no longer need to worry about being punished for illegal operation.
Thanks to the entry barriers set by the regulations, legal drivers' precarity in the marketplace is alleviated.
On the other hand, their precarity in the workplace has been significantly intensified: our survey shows that
because they struggle with mortgage or rental payments,30 drivers with rental or rental-to-own contracts
must significantly extend their work time. Just as the platform takes advantage of their intermediary position
to control drivers’ access to the ride-hailing market, the rental companies use rental or rent-to-own contracts
to manipulate drivers’ exit from the market, despite the fact that there are no formal employment relations
between drivers and the platform or drivers and car rental companies.

31

Ensuring effective control over labour supply by lease or debt relationship is not new. During the 1970s,
the debt-bondage mechanism was used in Peru to compete for labour: debt-bonded semi-proletarians were
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Under global capitalism, wage labour has been increasingly replaced by debt-bonded labour to improve
profits; in particular, scholars have noted the important role that labour contractors or intermediaries play
in recruiting and retaining forced labour, trapping workers in debt bondage and exploitation.33 As various
cases show, market discipline imposed by debt exacerbates the systematic vulnerability of workers and
creates pressure to remain at work.34 In the case of the ride-hailing industry, while the leasing or rent-toown contracts offered by third-party companies lower the barrier to entry, they increase the barrier to exiting.
Drivers encumbered by debt or lease payments have experienced a decline in their bargaining power. As a
result, they have to work longer hours and take greater risks, such as accepting the platform’s constant
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changes in payment/rewards policies.
Regulations stipulated by the Beijing municipal government are more stringent. That is to say, unlike their
counterparts in Nanjing, car rental companies in Beijing cannot help the platforms by providing ride-hailing
vehicle licenses. Consequently, the alliance between Didi and rental companies in Beijing is less developed
than in Nanjing. Nevertheless, rental companies in Beijing are indispensable because they supply vehicles
with a Beijing-registered license plate to drivers who do not own a car or have an eligible license plate. In
our sample, about one-fourth of Beijing drivers rely on rented vehicles. In contrast to Nanjing, few rental
companies in Beijing offer rent-to-own contracts.35
Because ride-hailing licenses for drivers and those for vehicles are both difficult to obtain, Didi in Beijing
has chosen to operate in the “grey area”: the platform continues to dispatch orders to unlicensed drivers and
vehicles. To retain drivers, Didi has promised, although informally, to reimburse the fines paid by drivers
who have been caught.36 Nonetheless, this situation is unfavourable to drivers because Didi's promise is
never written in a formal contract and the platform can always modify or cancel the promise.

The drivers: making choices under socio-economic constraints
Given the regulations stipulated by the municipal government and the coping strategies developed by the
platform, ride-hailing drivers make choices that are subject to their respective socio-economic constraints.
The drivers, who comprise a heterogeneous group, can be divided according to three criteria. First, in terms
of car ownership, there are both drivers who steer their own cars and drivers who acquire access to vehicles
through third-party car rental companies (by rent or rent-to-own). Second, in terms of the conformity to
local government regulations, there are both legal and illegal drivers, depending on whether or not they
have the required “double-licenses”. Third, in terms of socio-economic constraints, some drivers have
access to complementary income sources or less economic burdens, while others have no such access or
have more economic burdens.
These inter-related categories mutually determine a driver’s mode of work. In Table 1 we show drivers’
most-likely work mode under respective types of car ownership, legal status, and socio-economic
constraints. In Nanjing, because the municipal government suspended the issuance of new ride-hailing
licenses on April 2018, only ride-hailing drivers who steer their private cars and obtained their license prior
to that date can operate legally. These drivers can choose the length of their work time according to their
35
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own economic needs. Other drivers who operate privately-owned vehicles on the platform drive unlicensed
vehicles and operate illegally. Another scenario in the Nanjing setting is drivers who rent or rent-to-own
vehicles; their vehicles most likely are licensed and operate legally. Most of these rentee-drivers work
overtime because, in addition to operational expenses, they have to pay rent or mortgage loans.
(Table 1 is about here.)
In the Beijing setting, because “double-licenses” are especially difficult to obtain, the overwhelmingly
majority of ride-hailing drivers work illegally. In contrast to Nanjing, third-part rental companies are only
able to provide vehicles that have a Beijing-registered license plate. Therefore, only those who own a private
vehicle with a Beijing-registered license plate and, at the same time, hold a Beijing hukou can operate
legally. These drivers, however, tend to have better job options, including driving a traditional taxi; as a
result, they are rarely seen among ride-hailing drivers. The vast majority of ride-hailing drivers in Beijing
drive illegally whether they operate their own vehicles or rent vehicles from rental companies. In Beijing,
a driver is more likely to work overtime if her/his vehicle is subject to a rent contract.

Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we quantitatively estimate the extent to which a rental or rent-to-own contract can aggravate
labour precarity in the workplace. By applying multiple regression analysis and controlling for confounding
factors such as demographic characteristics and economic status, this exercise could offer a more accurate
and rigorous evaluation of the impacts of regulatory policies on precarity.

Data
Using a questionnaire survey, we conducted multiple rounds of interviews on more than 600 Didi Express
drivers.37 The 2018 round of survey was conducted in Nanjing in July 2018 with about 160 respondents;
the 2019 round was conducted in Nanjing in June 2019 with about 250 respondents and in Beijing in July
2019 with about 230 respondents. We paid two visits to Nanjing primarily because a couple of months after
our first Nanjing survey, a female passenger in Yueqing, Zhejiang province, was murdered by a Didi driver,
after which the enforcement of government regulations in Nanjing was significantly strengthened.38
To find ride-hailing drivers, each interviewer randomly selected a route and hailed vehicles through the
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Didi App between 9 am and 5 pm. Prior to the interview, each respondent was informed that the survey
was for research purposes only and anonymity was guaranteed; consent was obtained from each respondent.
The questionnaire sought information on drivers’ demographic details, social and economic status, how
drivers acquired their vehicles, and work conditions, such as work hours and work schedule.
Figure 2 presents drivers’ work time by vehicle ownership and survey cohort. Our pooled data show that
ride-hailing drivers worked 64.5 hours per week on average; the 2019 Nanjing cohort worked the longest
(67.1 hours). For all cohorts, drivers who had either a rental or a rent-to-own contract worked significantly
longer hours than those who did not. For example, in both the 2019 Nanjing cohort and 2019 Beijing cohort,
drivers who worked with a rented vehicle worked more than 80 hours per week, or significantly longer than
drivers who steered their own private cars (less than 60 hours per week). Our data also show that drivers
who had a rental or rent-to-own contract accounted for 47 per cent of the total labour supply in terms of
hours. These statistics largely disapprove the claim that the ride-hailing industry is a sharing economy in
which each driver provides services only with his/her own underutilized resources.
(Figure 2 is about here.)
Table 2 presents summary statistics of key variables related to worktime. Our data show that about 70 per
cent of ride-hailing drivers in the two cities worked with their own vehicles; the remaining 30 per cent
acquired vehicles from rental companies. Compared to 2018, Nanjing in 2019 saw significant increases in
the percentages of drivers who accessed vehicles through rental (from 9 per cent to 20 per cent) and who
were bound by a rent-to-own contract (from 12 per cent to 19 per cent). From 2018 to 2019, the share of
drivers with a rental contract almost doubled, increasing from less than 20 per cent to 38 per cent. As noted
above, this change very likely resulted from the “Yueqing incident”, after which the Nanjing municipal
government strengthened the enforcement of the “double-license” regulation and suspended the issuance
of ride-hailing vehicle licenses. In the Beijing cohort, about 76 per cent of drivers worked with their own
private vehicles and 24 per cent rented vehicles.
(Table 2 is about here.)
The demographic component of our data shows that a typical Didi driver was about 40 years old, male,
married, and had about 1.3 kids on average. In Nanjing, about 40 per cent of drivers came from the rural
area, while in Beijing, 68 per cent had rural origins. Overall, 61 per cent of drivers were migrants; in Beijing,
this figure was 79 per cent. About 42 per cent of drivers had a junior high education or less, 38 per cent had
a senior high school or secondary vocational education, and 20 per cent had a college or tertiary vocational
education. About 57 per cent of Didi ride-hailing drives had no access to social security; in the Beijing
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cohort, this figure was 64 per cent.

Methodology
We measure labour precarity in the production process by the length of the driver's worktime. Longer
worktime may indicate that drivers have weaker bargaining power when negotiating work conditions.
Particularly in the case of a platform-rental company nexus, extending work hours is the only way to achieve
the income needed to make ends meet. Longer worktime is also indicative of greater economic insecurity,
which is determined, on the one hand, by a driver’s financial burden and, on the other hand, by the
availability of other sources of income. Thus, we develop two hypotheses as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Drivers who rely on vehicles from rental companies would work longer hours than those
who bring their own vehicles to the ride-hailing platform.
Hypothesis 2: Drivers who are in a worse economic situation would work longer hours.
Based on the hypotheses, we specify the following regression model in semi-log form:
LNWORKHOUR !
$

= +" + +# - VEHICLE!
#%&

+ +' AGE! + +( GENDER ! + +) MARRIED! + +* URBAN! + ++ MIGRANT!
&"

+ +, KIDS! + +# - EDUCATION! + +&& 9:;<=>?!
#%&'

+ +# - COHORT! + @!

(1)

#%&$

where the outcome variable, LNWORKHOUR, denotes the logarithmic form of drivers’ weekly work hours
and the subscript i denotes the surveyed individuals. We specify the model in semi-log form to facilitate
interpretation: when the outcome variable is log transformed, the estimated coefficient value corresponds
to the percentage change in the outcome variable for a one-unit change in the explanatory variable. Among
the explanatory variables, VEHICLE denotes that drivers’ vehicles are acquired in one of the following
ways: privately-owned, rented, or rent-to-own. In the regression, we set privately-owned vehicles as the
reference group; thus, the coefficients of VEHICLE, β1 to β2, measure the percentage difference in work
hours between drivers who rent (or rent-to-own) vehicles and those who steer their own cars. Based on our
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qualitative analyses, we expect the signs of β1 and β2 to be both positive, implying that driving vehicles
acquired from a rental company is associated with longer working hours.
Our model also includes variables that measure the economic status of drivers: we use the number of kids
(KIDS) to proxy a driver’s economic burden, which we expect to be positively associated with work hours.
We use education (EDUCATION) and access (or lack thereof) to social security (INSURED) as proxies
for the availability of a driver’s other sources of income. We expect that both education level, which is
indicative of the likelihood of acquiring additional resources, and having social security are negatively
associated with work hours. In the model, we also control for drivers’ demographic information, including
age (AGE), gender (GENDER), marital status (MARRIED), urban or rural origin (URBAN), and local or
migrant background (MIGRANT). COHORT indicates whether the driver belongs to the 2018 Nanjing
sample, the 2019 Nanjing sample, or the 2019 Beijing sample.

Results
Table 3 presents the regression results for the relationship between the means of vehicle acquisition (vehicle
ownership) and Didi drivers’ work hours. In Model (1), we pool all data together, controlling for
demographic characteristics and survey cohorts. Our first hypothesis is supported: acquiring vehicles from
the rental companies was associated with significantly longer work hours. Specifically, a driver who rented
a vehicle worked 48.8 per cent more hours than a driver who worked with his/her own vehicle. Similarly,
the rent-to-own arrangement increased work hours by 27.4 per cent. Age was positively associated with
work hours, while having an urban origin was negatively associated with work hours. Didi drivers in Beijing
worked 17.9 per cent fewer hours than their Nanjing counterparts.
(Table 3 is about here.)
Model (2) also accounts for the driver’s economic status, including number of kids, driver education, and
whether or not the driver had access to social insurance. Although slightly reduced by this exercise, the
estimated coefficients of acquiring vehicles from rental companies remained significant and substantial:
compared to working with a privately-owned vehicle, car rental increased work hours by 46.5 per cent, and
acquiring vehicles by means of rent-to-own increased work hours by 22.5 per cent.
Both Model (1) and Model (2) show that, controlling for other variables, Beijing drivers worked
significantly fewer hours (16-18 per cent) than their counterparts in Nanjing. This can be explained by the
higher hourly earnings in Beijing: according to our 2019 survey, for a driver using his/her own car, the
hourly revenue was 47 RMB in Nanjing and 53 RMB in Beijing. The earning premium could indicate that
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competition among drivers was less intense in Beijing, thanks to the city’s comparatively more stringent
regulations and undeveloped platform-rental company nexus.
With regards to proxies for drivers’ economic status, number of kids was positively associated with work
hours: having one more child (and hence a heavier economic burden) would increase drivers’ work hours
by 9.9 per cent. Education level was negatively associated with work hours: compared to those with a junior
high school education or less, attending senior high or secondary vocational school was associated with
10.8 per cent fewer work hours, while attending college or tertiary vocational school was associated with
15.3 per cent fewer hours (at the 0.10 significance level). Having access to social security would reduce
work hours by 34.3 per cent. Both of our hypotheses, in other words, were confirmed.
Finally, we test robustness in Models (3)-(5), which replicate the specification of Model (2) but run
regression separately for three survey cohorts. Our results show that, for each cohort, regardless of location
and survey year, acquiring vehicles from rental companies was always associated with remarkably longer
work hours. In other words, relying on rental companies significantly increased workplace precarity.

Discussion and Conclusion
This study has explored how the "tolerant and prudent" policy and corresponding regulations stipulated by
municipal governments have shaped labour precarity in China's rapidly growing ride-hailing sector. The
regulations, which aim to stimulate job creation, have created a generally favourable institutional
environment for development of the ride-hailing sector. Under the regulatory framework, platform capital
in alliance with third-party car rental companies has played an active role in shaping drivers’ labour
precarity. The market-focused regulations have reduced licensed drivers’ marketplace precarity by granting
them legal status, yet they also have intensified workplace precarity: relying on car rental companies to
obtain a qualification has trapped drivers in longer work hours and higher uncertainties.
The dynamic between regulators and capital has shaped and intensiﬁed the precarious conditions that ridehailing drivers face. Rather than simply attributing labour precarity to regulation or the lack of it, our study
presents a more nuanced analysis. We argue that the extent to which regulation helps reduce precarity
largely depends on the nature of regulation. In the case of the ride-hailing industry, our analysis shows that
regulations that exclusively focus on the marketplace and neglect the workplace can only encourage more
rental or debt arrangements. These arrangements favour capital at the expense of workers’ welfare. This
observation does not contradict the finding in the literature that the deregulation associated with the rise of
neoliberalism since the mid-1970s has increased labour precarity. The complexity of the platform economy
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has raised new challenges to regulators. Effective policies to protect labour welfare should also focus on
workplace labour relations.
Thus, our study also sheds light on the political economy of labour legislation in the Chinese context. The
evolving conflicts in labour relations have prompted regulators to respond. Both China’s Labour Law of
1995 and the Labour Contract Law of 2008 were born in an institutional environment where regulations
largely lagged behind. For instance, as the market economy burgeoned in the 1980s, the labour force of
China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) diversified: the proportion of informal workers—who were mostly
rural-to-urban migrant workers—grew rapidly. By the early 1990s, conflicts between informal workers and
their work units had intensified in the form of explosive strikes and labour disputes.39 It was under these
circumstances that China’s Labour Law of 1995 was stipulated to cope with new challenges that threatened
the market economy.40 What followed in the next decade was the increasing use of “dispatch labour”
(labour outsourcing that featured separated employment and managerial relations)41 and student interns in
new informal, non-standard employment arrangements. These arrangements led to escalating labour
conflicts over problems such as wage arrears and substandard working conditions. This time, the regulators
reacted with the Labour Contract Law of 2008 and its 2012 amendment to, once again, encapsulate all
forms of employment under the rule of law.42
By and large, the regulation of labour relations in contemporary China has developed through a repetitive
and ongoing process. Informal employment—usually characterized by a lack of job security and benefits—
first develops beyond the existing regulatory framework, at which point the state steps in and
institutionalizes new developments so as to maintain social stability. This process tends to be contentious
and conflictual. Then, with social, economic, and technological changes, a new form of informal, nonstandard employment emerges, blooms, and, after a period of time, becomes incorporated by the state into
a uniform legal framework through another conflictual institutionalization process. As the platform
economy today increasingly produces precarious labour and reframes the nature of work, momentum
towards another stage of (re-)regulating work in the near future should increase.

39
40
41
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: A Tripartite Framework: The Municipal Government, Capital (Platform and Rental Companies), and Labour

Municipal government
"Tolerant and prudent":
market-focused
regulations ("doublelicenses"); lacking
workplace regulations

Capital

Platforms :
insufficient labour
supply

Labour

Rise of thirdparty car rental
companies

Less marketplace precarity for licensed drivers: granted
legal status and facing less competition
Less/more marketplace precarity for unlicensed drivers:
facing less competition but more risk of being penalized
More workplace precarity: drivers trapped by rental or debt
contracts and working longer hours

Source: The authors.
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Figure 2: Drivers’ Weekly Work Hours by Vehicle Ownership and Survey Cohort
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Nanjing, 2019
Rent

Beijing, 2019

Rent-to-own

Table 1: Driver Groups and Their Most-Likely Mode of Work

City

Car ownership

Conformity to regulations

Whether or

(whether or not they have

not they work

“double-licenses”)

overtime

Legal

Depends*

Illegal

Depends

Legal

Yes

Legal (Rare)

Depends

Illegal

Depends

Illegal

Yes

Privately-own
Nanjing
Rent or rent-to-own

Privately-own
Beijing
Rent or rent-to-own
Source: The authors.
* It depends on individual socio-economic conditions.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Key Variables
Pooled
Variable

(N=540)
Mean or pct.

Vehicle ownership
Privately-owned
Rent
Rent-to-own
Demographic characteristics
Age (years)
Gender
Female
Male
Marriage
Unmarried
Married
Region of origin
Rural
Urban
Habitat
Local
Migrant
Proxies for economic status
Number of kids
Education level
Junior high or lower
Senior high or secondary vocational
College or tertiary vocational
Access to social security
Uninsured
Insured

Stratified by survey cohorts
Nanjing, 2018 Nanjing, 2019 Beijing 2019
(N=108)
(N=221)
(N=211)
Mean or pct.
Mean or pct. Mean or pct.

70.37
19.44
10.19

78.7
9.26
12.04

61.09
19.91
19

75.83
24.17
N/A

40.60

38.46

41.81

40.48

4.44
96.11

4.63
95.37

4.98
95.02

2.37
97.63

6.31
95.56

7.41
92.59

3.17
96.83

4.27
95.73

50.00
50.00

40.74
59.26

37.1
62.9

68.25
31.75

39.26
60.74

43.52
56.48

54.75
45.25

20.85
79.15

1.31
(0.65)

1.23
(0.69)

1.32
(0.59)

1.36
(0.69)

42.04
37.96
20.00

28.7
49
25.93

36.65
41.18
22.17

54.5
30.81
14.69

57.04
42.96

62.04
37.96

47.51
52.49

64.45
35.55

Source:
Authors’ survey data.
Notes:
For mean values, standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 3: The impacts of means of vehicle acquisition on Didi drivers' work hours
Stratified by survey cohorts
Pooled
Pooled
Nanjing,
Nanjing,
Beijing
2018
2019
2019
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Vehicle ownership (ref.=privately-owned)
Rent
0.488***
0.465***
0.425***
0.432***
0.446***
(0.046)
(0.047)
(0.107)
(0.081)
(0.065)
Rent-to-own
0.274***
0.225***
0.227*
0.237**
(0.075)
(0.080)
(0.124)
(0.100)
Demographic characteristics
Age (years)
0.008**
0.006*
0.002
0.011**
0.001
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.007)
(0.005)
(0.005)
Male
0.047
0.017
0.270
-0.092
-0.239
(0.140)
(0.118)
(0.300)
(0.142)
(0.356)
Married
0.132
0.028
0.193
-0.019
-0.043
(0.095)
(0.094)
(0.196)
(0.219)
(0.131)
Urban
-0.209***
-0.074
-0.053
-0.084
-0.065
(0.070)
(0.070)
(0.157)
(0.113)
(0.117)
Migrant
0.147*
0.025
-0.197
-0.036
0.374**
(0.076)
(0.077)
(0.161)
(0.118)
(0.145)
Proxies for economic status
Number of kids
0.099**
0.060
0.157*
0.063
(0.045)
(0.109)
(0.089)
(0.056)
Education (ref.=junior high or lower)
Senior high or secondary vocational
-0.108*
-0.176
0.083
-0.264***
(0.058)
(0.120)
(0.098)
(0.093)
College or tertiary vocational
-0.153*
-0.215
0.093
-0.357**
(0.084)
(0.151)
(0.127)
(0.155)
Insured
-0.343***
-0.290**
-0.377***
-0.286***
(0.060)
(0.141)
(0.095)
(0.094)
Cohort (ref.=2018 Nanjing)
2019 Nanjing
-0.002
0.017
(0.074)
(0.070)
2019 Beijing
-0.179**
-0.163**
(0.077)
(0.072)
N
Adj. R-sq

540
0.150

540
0.227

108
0.129

221
0.170

211
0.369

Source:
Authors’ survey data.
Notes:
Results are presented as semi-log OLS estimation with robust standard errors in parentheses. For each
result, significance levels are * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p<0.01.
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